Counter-terrorism, a question of performance

‘What's important is not whether the government adopts a soft or hard attitude to terrorism, but how they react to it,' historian Beatrice de Graaf stated on 28 January at the first conference organised by the Centre for Terrorism and Counter-terrorism (CTC). She also presented her book ‘Theatre of anxiety’ (in Dutch).

Closed session

Wholly in humanities tradition, the conference had a long, rather dry but adequate title: State of the art conference on research into 'Terrorism, counter-terrorism and radicalisation.' The first part was a closed session, by invitation only, reserved for professionals in the area of terrorism prevention. Apparently there are now quite a number of these professionals: when the visitors to the public part of the conference arrived, the room was already almost full, with more than a hundred participants. The conference reviewed activities over the past five years and looked towards what a future with terrorism might hold. 

Patty Hearst against the background of the logo of the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), the least political of the three American groups. The SLA is particularly known for having kidnapped Hearst, a member of a wealthy family, who became a member of the group. Later she was said to have been brainwashed.  

Database

Historian Dr Beatrice de Graaf, also the woman behind the database of research about terrorism and counter-terrorism, is a lecturer at the Centre for Terrorism and Counter-terrorism (CTC), part of Campus the Hague. She has made detailed studies of terrorism, particularly in the sixties and seventies in the Netherlands, the US, Italy and Germany. The Netherlands had de Moluccan hijackings and hostage-taking (1975-1978), the United States the Weather Underground Organization (1969 - disintegration from 1977), the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense (1966 - approx. 1970) and the Symbionese Liberation Army (1973-1975), Italy the Red Brigade (1970 - approx. 1985) and Germany the Red Army Fraction (1970 -approx. 1995).

Theatre of anxiety

Logo of the Black Panthers

De Graaf has set out her findings in ‘Theater van de angst’ (Theatre of Anxiety). The crux of her conclusion is that it is not so relevant whether the government adopts a hard or soft approach to terrorism; what is more important is how they approach it. Performativity, is what De Graaf calls it: what attitude does the government demonstrate through its actions; how does it communicate? De Graaf shows that visible repression can lead to a spiral of violence and counter-violence: terrorists use government violence as an impetus for counter-violence and to validate their own violent acts. This can generate an atmosphere of anxiety and outrage: anxiety about terrorists as felt by conservative citizens and indignation about government violence by more progressive citizens.

Media

The fact that the Moluccan hostage crisis in the seventies did not give rise to anxiety in society, De Graaf attributes to the more reserved attitude of the government. In her opinion, matters escalated in Germany and Italy because the police took a hard line against the rebellious left-wing youth movement. The media reflected what happened - and often exaggerated events - which caused irrational emotions to harden among citizens.

The intercity train that was hijacked in 1977 by a group of young Moluccans was intercepted close to the Drenth village of De Punt. The train was eventually liberated by marines, while Starfighter jet planes flew low over the train. Two hostages and six hijackers were killed. 'That we had to resort to violence to put an end to the hijacking is something we perceive as a defeat,' Prime Minister Den Uyl said after the crisis was over. This can be seen as an example of ‘low performance’.

Paranoid

The logo of the Weather Underground Organization, originally known as Weatherman.

The mechanism was most extreme in Italy, where the security services engaged in liquidations, and in the United States where President Nixon increasingly extended the authority of the police and judiciary. He became completely paranoid, which eventually led to the Watergate scandal, that cost him the presidency. 
Should the government not take any action, then? Yes, they should, but preferably behind the scenes, in the form of intelligence and detective work, rather than performance.

Different times

De Graaf recognises that times have changed. Prime Minister Joop den Uyl and Minister of Justice Dries van Agt called together the chief editors of the major newspapers and urged them to take a measured approach to reporting on the hostage-taking and hijacking. Today that would be unthinkable. And today we also have internet that spreads news very rapidly, sometimes with strongly biased comments; it is much harder for the government today than thirty or forty years ago to exercise influence on the media. But, writes De Graaf, that does not mean that lessons cannot be learned from the past, particularly in terms of performativity.

Limitations

In Italy in 1978 the Red Brigades kidnapped and murdered Christian Democratic politician Aldo Moro. Moro can be seen on the photo during his kidnapping. The same fate awaited German Jürgen Ponto, director of the Dresdner Bank (1977), Hanns-Martin Schleyer, manager and economist and from 1933 to 1945 member of the SS (1977) and industrialist Ernst Zimmermann (1995) at the hands of the Red Army Faction.

The speaker before De Graaf was Dr Christianne de Poot, of the Research and Documentation Centre of the Ministry of Justice (WODC). She presented the research that she and colleagues have conducted into Jihadic terrorism in the Netherlands. The sources were classified criminal investigations from 2001 to 2005. Acording to De Poot, this already represents one of the limitations of the research. Her population - a further limitation - comprised 113 persons, 93 men and 20 women. 

Mixed

Logo of the Red Army Fraction (RAF)

De Poot explained that Jihadic groups were seldom just international or national, but were almost always a mix of the two. This while the press often reacts exaggeratedly if the international character of a group becomes known, as if this is the benchmark for danger. The mixed character also applies to educational level.  The groups often differ in terms of composition and have no hierarchical structure. What they have in common is a free general ideology, that glosses over the actual differences through their origin. 
It is not possible to create a profile of a terrorist activist: 49% are illegal in the Netherlands, 49% are ex-drug addicts or criminals, and then there is a group of 'seekers' who are experiencing an existential identity crisis and finally there are the idealists or political activists.  

It was a useful research project, but that some of the research material was restricted was regarded as a problem. And what is the situation today with the threat of terrorism in the Netherlands?

See also

Beatrice de Graaf on her book in radio programme OVT

Beatrice de Graaf
Theater van de angst
Publisher: Boom
394 pages
ISBN 978-90-8506810 5
€ 25

(28 January 2009)